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Is China a Threat to Mesoamerica’s Development?
Roldan Muradian1

Mesoamerica2 is currently facing a daunting development challenge.
After about a decade and a half of implementing outward-oriented
development policies, it is time to reckon the results of this model and to
figure out new, creative, and more effective strategies for moving the bulk
of its population out of poverty. The outcomes of the outward-oriented
development model have been disappointing in Mesoamerica according to a
number of indicators of socioeconomic development.

Despite an

impressive expansion of exports, economic growth has been below
expected rates.

Even though for a period of approximately ten years,

exports have expanded by more than fourfold, average income per capita
has increased by only 20 percent.3

This is a meager performance if

compared to the 9–10 percent average annual rate of economic growth that
China has experienced in the same period of time. Another remarkable
feature is that economic growth in the countries that make up Mesoamerica
has been very unstable across time, experiencing alternate phases of booms
and bursts, including the occurrence of severe economic crises.
Furthermore, there have not been major improvements with regards to
poverty alleviation or income inequality, and particularly in Honduras, El
Salvador, and Guatemala, high levels of violent crimes have been
persistent.4
A key component of the outward-oriented development model was the
creation of special zones for the promotion of exports—zones where socalled “maquila” plants were established. A bundle of economic policies
for the promotion of the maquila sector, including tax exceptions,
deregulations, and the facilitation of temporary imports, were applied by all
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the countries of the region. Most of these measures were supposed to be a
temporary means for the consolidation of a nascent, outward-oriented
manufacturing industry.

NAFTA and the implementation of these

economic policies produced a noteworthy transformation in the composition
of exports. Further, economic liberalization has considerably affected the
performance of the rural sector.

Most governmental bodies hitherto

involved in the commercialization or price control of agricultural products
have been phased out, and state support for agricultural production has been
greatly reduced, including technical advice and subsidies. Additionally,
trade liberalization has induced a downward trend in the prices of a number
of agricultural products. These processes have created conditions favoring
economies of scale and have contributed to the displacement of small
producers, subsequently resulting in massive out-migration of the rural
poor.
The outward-oriented model predicted that most of the labor surplus
arising from rural-urban migration would be absorbed by the manufacturing
export sector. In reality, however, despite the expansion of exports and the
structural changes in the composition of the economy, relatively high levels
of migration suggest that employment growth in the manufacturing sector
has not outweighed employment losses in the primary sector. Migration to
either marginal urban areas (in order to become part of the informal sector)
or to North America has been the most common options for those laborers
who were both displaced from rural areas by a lack of work and also could
not be engaged as low-skill workers in the manufacturing or service sectors.
In short, economic diversification and expansion of exports as a result of
liberal economic reforms have not been accompanied by a generalized and
sizeable improvement of development indicators in the region.

This

contrasts sharply with the outcomes of globalization in other regions of the
world, such as Southeast Asia or China, where a rapid integration into the
world economy has been generally concomitant with declining poverty rates
and high economic growth.5
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Two critical factors have to be taken into account to understand why the
results of the outward-oriented development model have been so
disappointing in Mesoamerica: (1) the economic policies that have been
implemented in order to promote export expansion, vis-à-vis those adopted
more successfully in other regions of the world; and (2) the effect of China
and other emerging Asian players on the role Mesoamerica plays in the
world economy. This paper focuses on the latter concern, although the
former issue is also addressed briefly. Hence, the two main questions to be
tackled in this article are the following: (a) What are the effects of China on
the way Mesoamerica integrates into the world economy, particularly with
regard to its trade pattern with the United States?; and (b) What are the
long-term development implications of these effects?

With those two

questions in mind, this paper addresses basically three issues: (1)
Mesoamerica’s trade patterns during the period of implementation of
neoliberal economic policies; (2) China’s trade emergence and the
subsequent impact on Mesoamerica; and (3) the environmental concerns
that arise out of this. The relationship between China’s integration into the
world economy and development prospects in Mesoamerica is assessed
principally through changes in export patterns from Mesoamerica to China
and through competition between both regions in the area of exports of lowtech manufactured products to the American market.
The objective of this paper is to provide preliminary information to
address the aforementioned questions, mainly by means of describing trends
in export patterns in Mesoamerica during the period of implementation of
economic liberalization policies.

The analysis is meant to be a pilot

exercise that should bring about insights for further elaboration on this
subject. Section I, which follows this introduction, briefly describes the
sources of data and analysis. Section II summarizes the most relevant
results. The paper then concludes with a general discussion of the results,
the implications of those results for development prospects in Mesoamerica,
and some conclusive remarks.
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I. METHODS AND DATA SOURCES
As stated above, the methodological approach of this paper focuses on
analyzing trade patterns of key sectors during the period of implementation
of the outward-oriented development model in Mesoamerica, with
particular emphasis on trade with the United States (by far the largest
trading partner), and a comparison with the performance of Chinese
exports. The figures presented in the following section are devoted to
showing trends across time. These results are expected to be the point of
departure for the elaboration of working hypotheses and they should
provide insights for further analysis. Specifically, the following four trade
patterns were analyzed:
a. Exports of primary products and manufactured products based
on natural resources, both in monetary and physical units, to the
world and to China;
b. Exports of pollution-intensive sectors, in physical units, to the
world and China;
c. Total Latin American exports to China; and
d. Share of U.S. imports from China and Mesoamerica in
manufacturing sectors with low, medium, and high technological
content.
This paper has adopted ECLAC’s (Economic Commission for Latin
America and the Caribbean) classification system for grouping products
according to their relative technological content and their pollution
intensity. The following is a summary of the categories used for this paper.
Polluting sectors: pulp and paper, products derived from oil, chemical
products, fertilizers, products manufactured from wood, minerals, and
products derived from minerals.
Primary products: fresh fruits, meat, rice, cocoa, tea, coffee, wood, coal,
oil, gas, and concentrated minerals.
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Manufactured products based on natural resources: products derived
from fruits and meat, beverages, products derived from wood, vegetable
oils, basic metals, products derived from oil, cement, glass, and precious
stones.
Low-tech manufactured products: textiles, cloth, shoes, products
manufactured from leather, ceramics, simple metal structures, furniture,
jewelery, toys, and plastic products.
Medium-tech

manufactured

products:

vehicles,

synthetic

fibers,

chemicals, fertilizers, plastics, iron, steel, tubes, wires, engines, industrial
machinery, pumps, watches, and ships.
High-tech manufactured products: machines for data processing,
telecommunication equipment, transistors, turbines, power equipment,
pharmaceutical products, optical products, precision equipment, and
photographic equipment.
The data source is the online database BADACEL (Banco de Datos
Estadísticos de Comercio Exterior), developed by ECLAC.

II. RESULTS
Figures 1, 2, and 3 show the degree of expansion of overall exports in
Mesoamerica and Central America (Mesoamerica excluding Mexico) and
the changes in the composition of exports that have taken place during the
last two decades. In the period of analysis, the region has experienced a
remarkable decline in its share of the primary exports sector. Nevertheless,
Figure 4 shows that in spite of this, total exports of primary products and
manufactured products based on natural resources have increased in a very
remarkable manner when assessed using physical units (weight), both in
Mesoamerica as a whole and in Central America. This trend is likely
driving soaring pressures on local natural resources and ecosystems.
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Figure 1. Total exports from Mesoamerica (all products). Value
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Figure 2. Share of different sectors to total exports from Mesoamerica. Value
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Figure 3. Share of different sectors to total exports from Central America. Value
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Figure 4. Index of exports of primary products and manufactures based on natural resources.
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Figure 5 reveals that total exports (in physical units) of the most pollutant
sectors have witnessed a cyclical trend, mainly driven by Mexican exports.
In Central America, exports of the most pollutant products, measured in
weight units, have remained rather constant and relatively negligible.
Figure 6 illustrates exports of primary and polluting products from
Mesoamerica to China across time, and Figure 7 illustrates the share of
exports to China compared to total exports from Mesoamerica and Central
America. These figures show both that exports to China are still negligible
compared to exports to other parts of the world, and that exports of natural
resources to China are not significant and do not follow a clear trend across
time. This is in contrast to the trend in Latin America as a whole. Figures 8
and 9 reveal that the Chinese economic boom has induced rising physical
outflows, driven by exports from South America, in both the primary and
polluting sectors in Latin America.
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Figure 5. Exports polluting sectors. Physical units
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Figure 6. Exports of natural resources and polluting sectors from Mesoamerica to China. Weight
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Figure 7. Share exports to China to total exports
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Figure 8. Latin America: index of physical outflows (Exports) . 1990 = 100
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Figure 9. Share Latin American exports to China (to total exports by sector)
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Figure 10 depicts the share of U.S. imports, from Mesoamerica and
China, of manufactured products with different technological content. Even
though this comparison does not establish a causal relationship between the
two trends, the figure reveals that China’s share in American imports of
manufactured products with low, medium, and high technological content
has increased steadily, with a noticeable boost during the last five years of
analysis. Even though Mesoamerica’s share in American imports of lowand medium-technology manufactured products has also grown, during the
last years of analysis the trend has shifted towards stagnation. In the case of
high-tech manufactured products, both regions have experienced a
remarkable rise in their shares. However, particularly during the last years
of analysis, the rate of market share growth has been considerably higher
for China than for Mesoamerica. These trends suggest that Chinese
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competition is likely preventing further diversification of Mesoamerican
economies. Though difficult to test, further analysis should be devoted to
assess this working hypothesis.
Figure 10. Share of U.S. imports of low-, medium- and high-tech manufactured goods.
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The main insights of the data analysis may be summarized as follows:
•

Despite a declining share of primary exports to total exports in
Mesoamerica, physical outflows of primary products and natural
resource-based manufactured products have experienced a considerable
expansion during the period of analysis.

•

There are no clear trends with regard to the share of exports to China
compared to total exports, or the physical flows of natural resources or
polluting sectors from Mesoamerica to China. This is in contrast to
what is happening in Latin America as a whole. The Chinese boom is
steering increasing flows of natural resources and polluting products
from Latin America (particularly South America) to China.
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•

Even though our analysis does not establish causal relationships, the
results show that manufactured products imported from Mesoamerica
are losing market share in the United States, while China has
alternatively experienced a significant rise in its U.S. market share of
manufactured imports with low, medium, and high technological
content. This is likely preventing further economic diversification in
Mesoamerica, and it is probably promoting an increase in the relative
importance of the primary sector in Mesoamerican exports.

III. DISCUSSION
This section will address the following three issues of concern: a) the
environmental implications of rising physical outflows; b) the implications
of Chinese competition in the American manufacturing market; and c) the
reasons why the outward-oriented model for development has shed such
divergent results―in terms of improvement of development indicators―in
Asia and Mesoamerica.
A. The Environmental Impacts
A declining proportion of primary exports to total exports may suggest
that pressures on local natural resources from the exporting sector are also
diminishing. However, the rise of the total outflows (exports measured in
physical

units)

of

primary

products

and

natural

resource-based

manufactured products actually indicates that the Mesoamerican exporting
sector is likely enlarging its burden on the environment. In addition, rising
total outflows of primary products and manufactured products also indicate
that the analysis of physical flows may shed different insights on the
relationship between trade and the environment. Increasing physical flows
are often driving conflicts about access to resources, particularly between
local users or dwellers and owners of natural resources who are part of
large-scale exporting networks, as well as conflicts about the social
distribution of negative environmental impacts.6,7

Furthermore, many
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products from the emerging nontraditional and capital-intensive agricultural
exporting sector―products such as flowers, snow peas, broccoli, melon,
and chayote―use water and agrochemicals intensively. As a result, the
expansion of this sector, which is among the most dynamic in Mesomarica
(and Latin America as a whole), is often associated with conflicts related to
water access, as well as problems linked to occupational health and
degradation of natural resources (water, land) as a result of pollution.8
In addition, the production of renewable natural resources is often
associated with land-use conflicts, especially in areas with particularly high
levels of biodiversity.9 Given the current structural characteristics of the
Latin American agricultural sector—low crop yields, high ratio of cropland
to total land area, and a large share of agriculture in overall exports—
Barbier estimates that about 70 percent of the expansion of cultivated land
area that will take place during the following decades will originate from
deforestation and wetland conversion.10 Furthermore, given the unequal
distribution of land tenure in most Mesoamerican countries, a further
expansion of the physical scale of primary exports is likely steering large
concentrations of economic benefits.
B. China’s Trade Impact on Mesoamerica
For Mesoamerica, the large importance of trade with the United States
explains why the Chinese economic boom has been relatively decoupled
from the expansion of flows of natural resources and polluting products
exported from this region to China; this is in contrast to what has has
happened with South America (see fig. 8).

Moreover, Mesoamerica is

relatively less endowed with nonrenewable natural resources, as compared
to South America. China currently accounts for about one quarter of global
consumption of tin, zinc, aluminium, and copper, and the share of Chinese
consumption compared to worldwide consumption of these products has
more than doubled during the last decade.11 The recent increase in global
demand for nonrenewable natural resources is concentrated in Asia,
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particularly in China. For instance, it is reported that from 2000 to 2003,
China accounted for 76, 95, 99, and 100 percent of the increase in global
demand for aluminium, steel, nickel, and copper, respectively.12
South American and African countries, as large providers of
nonrenewable natural resources to the world economy, are expected to be
considerably impacted by these trends. However, there are other types of
impacts on Mesoamerica as a result of China’s emergence as a major player
in the world economy. Those impacts need to be assessed mainly by
analyzing China’s impact on trade patterns between Mesoamerica and the
United States, particularly in the manufacturing sector in which
Mesoamerica has recently specialized.
As stated above, the fact that the Chinese share in American imports of
all types of manufactured products is dramatically increasing, while the
Mesoamerican share has already started to experience stagnation, supports a
claim that competition from China in the manufacturing sector is the main
channel through which the Chinese economic boom is affecting the way
Mesoamerica integrates into the world economy. China’s vast production
capacity and its enormous provision of cheap labor are depressing the price
of manufactured products.13 While benefiting low-income consumers, this
is also preventing the value of low-skilled labor from rising worldwide,
particularly in countries specializing in the provision of labor for
manufacturing, such as Mesoamerican countries. In addition to the low
costs of Chinese labor, the ease of current international mobility of capital
and production and the declining freight costs are also making China a
strong competitor with Mesoamerica for foreign investment.14

This is

steering a production shift from Mexico to China. For instance, Horbath
reports that about 34 percent of all the companies that have closed down
their maquilas in Mexico between 2001 and 2003 have moved production to
China.15
Due to the integration of Chinese workers into the world economy and
the higher cost of labor in Mesoamerica (measured in terms of minimum
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wage), low-skilled workers in the Mesoamerican maquila sector would need
to considerably increase their productivity in order to enlarge their
bargaining power and attain higher salaries.

However, a major

improvement in productivity due to increased capabilities of workers is not
very likely to occur in Mesoamerica, given the structural lack of investment
in education and innovation in the region. In general, Latin American
economies have weaker education and technological infrastructures when
compared to East and Southeast Asia.16

The trends presented in the

previous section suggest that Chinese competition is limiting the expansion
of the manufacturing export sector in Mesoamerica, and thus its capacity to
provide employment.

Additionally, as mentioned before, economic

liberalization policies have reduced employment opportunities in the rural
sector. The combination of all of the above factors makes competition with
China more likely to hinder the integration of low-skilled workers into the
formal economic sector, which will maintain the high share of informal
labor and widen income distribution.
C. Divergent Results of the Outward-Development Model
There has been a tremendous expansion in both the scale of exports and
the overall income earned by exporters of cheap manufactured products.
This has been fueled by rising global demand for these products. Thus,
despite falling prices of manufactured products, the income terms of trade
have improved noticeably in Asia.17 However, in spite of following trends
similar to China and Southeast Asian countries in terms of export expansion
and diversification, most Mesoamerican countries have experienced two
“lost” decades, characterized by stagnant social indicators of development
and scanty economic growth.18 Hence, critical questions must be asked:
Why have the outcomes of the outward-oriented development model been
so different in Asia and Mesoamerica? Why has Mesoamerica experienced
a gap between the achievement of some expected outcomes of the outwardoriented model—namely exports expansion and diversification—and the
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improvement of development indicators? Certainly there is not a single
answer to these daunting questions. Nonetheless, I think that a critical
factor in understanding these disparate outcomes is the extent to which the
manufacture-exporting sector has established backward and forward
linkages with other sectors of the national economy; another key factor is
the extent to which mechanisms for knowledge transfer and innovation have
been established.
1. Maquila Sectors in Mesoamerica and Backward and Forward
Linkages
One reason for the resulting differences between China and Mesoamerica
is that the maquila sector in Mesoamerica has generally been unable to
upgrade production processes from assembly-line activities in order to
become the driving force of dynamic networks of innovation; while exactly
that type of upgrade is happening in Asia.

The maquila in Central

America—with the exception of the production of microchips by Intel in
Costa Rica—has remained specialized in low-tech manufacturing,
particularly in the textile industry. In general, when characterized according
to trade patterns, Central American countries still specialize in sectors with
very little value added.19 Nevertheless, when characterized following trade
classifications based on technological content, the manufacture-exporting
sector in Mexico has experienced a dramatic transformation. The share of
high-tech manufactured products in the total outcome of the exporting
sector has noticeably increased in Mexico.20

However, when analyzed

according to processes taking place at the production level―even though
some clusters have been able to achieve a higher level of industrial
upgrading21―most of the Mexican maquila is still characterized by
assembly of imported parts (mainly from the United States) and the reexporting of the final products back to the United States, adding only the
assembly work of usually low-skilled labor at the local level.22
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The persistence of assembly line processes has been encouraged by the
very incentives designed to promote the maquila sector, such as tax
exceptions for transitory imports of inputs for the maquila. These
incentives—including zero trade tariffs, no value added, or income taxes—
create barriers for establishing local backward linkages because the
substitution of imports by local provision is hampered by the relative larger
cost of the latter.23 On the contrary, the transfer of knowledge and the
acquisition of local upgrading capacities have been two key pillars of the
outward-oriented development model implemented in China.24 The lack of
local linkages of the maquila sector in Mesoamerica explains why a
tremendous expansion of the exporting sector has been generally decoupled
from the evolution of local development indicators.
2. Other Institutional Components
Institutional components may also play a role in explaining the
differences between China and Mesoamerica regarding the performance of
the outward-oriented development model. For example, the concentration
of economic power is a distinctive feature of Mesoamerican countries as
compared to China.25 This concentration has led to economic inefficiencies
because of a high incidence of monopolies, oligopolies, structural highincome inequality, large levels of social exclusion, and low internal
demand. These conditions have become a serious impediment to balanced
economic development in Mesoamerica because the economic benefits
arising from the new opportunities offered by the globalization process have
been reaped by only a small portion of the population. Corruption and
weak institutions have also been persistent features of Mesoamerican
countries, and these have hindered the consolidation of long-term policies
or effective wealth-redistribution programs, thereby creating conditions for
political and social instability.
In China, and most East Asian countries, global economic integration has
been accompanied by state interventions aiming to ensure knowledge
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transfer and to build up local industrial capacities.26 This has not been the
case in Mesoamerica. Contrary to what occurred when the model of import
substitution industrialization was applied, long-term planning for economic
development in Latin America—including the implementation of policies
for achieving industrialization—has generally been abandoned during the
liberalization period.27 Industrialization was expected to be the outcome of
a larger integration into the world economy by means of following
comparative advantages—a process that would be accelerated by foreign
investment. Nonetheless, as argued above, liberalization policies have not
been sufficient to trigger actual industrialization beyond mere assembly of
imported parts. Paradoxically, as mentioned above, economic incentives
for the promotion of the maquila have actually contributed to prevent the
development of local industrial capacities in the long term. Many of these
measures that were supposed to have been temporary, in order to allow the
consolidation of the exporting-manufacturing sector, have nevertheless
become permanent.28
After assessing the performance of the outward-oriented development
model in Mesoamerica and Asia, it seems clear that a shift—from policies
encouraging mere assembly processes to policies aiming to promote the
development of local industrial capacities—is needed in order to make
integration into the world economy a real driving force of development.
However, the current harsh competition with China makes such policy
changes difficult because it reduces the bargaining power of national states,
vis-à-vis international capitals in search of appropriate conditions for the
establishment of manufacturing plants.

The Mesoamerican region is

definitively facing a daunting development challenge and, at least for the
time being, it does not appear that the necessary policy changes will be
developed and adopted.

For example, Central American countries are

currently setting up free trade agreements with the United States without
systematically evaluating why NAFTA has dramatically failed to shape a
sustainable and equitable development path for Mexico. Further, economic
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planning or state interventions for promoting industrialization are still
almost forbidden words in the mainstream political discourse in
Mesoamerica. The dogmatic adoption of development recipes has made
politicians and economists unable to either recognize previous mistakes or
invent alternative options for the future.

IV. CONCLUSIONS
The Chinese economic boom has increased the physical outflows in the
primary and polluting sectors from South America to China. This is then
increasing the share of these sectors in Latin American total exports and,
subsequently, its degree of primary specialization. However, the effect has
been different in Mesoamerica. There is no clear trend toward increasing
physical flows in the primary sector between Mesoamerica and China. The
significance of manufactured-products trade with the United States, and the
greater share of manufactured products in exports in this region, may
explain this outcome.
Even though the evidence is not conclusive, the results suggest that
Chinese competition is leading to a loss of market share of Mesoamericanmanufactured exports in the United States. This prevents further economic
diversification and will likely enlarge the scale of primary exports. It is
revealing that while the share of primary exports has dropped in the period
of analysis, total physical outflows of natural resources from Mesoamerica
has increased substantially, which is likely linked to rising pressures on the
environment.
The failure to couple the integration into the world economy with major
improvements in development indicators suggests that Mesoamerican
countries need to undertake radical changes in order to create incentives for
promoting the acquisition of real industrial capacities. However, strong
competition with China is making such a shift extremely difficult because
any attempt to bargain for greater local benefits would likely impart larger
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operational costs on transnational corporations and add an incentive for
international capital to move away.
There is a need for further research on policies for the promotion of
forward and backward linkages between the exporting-manufacturing sector
and other local economic sectors, in addition to strategies for ensuring
knowledge transfer and the acquisition of industrial skills (which would
allow a move away and forward from assembly processes). The role of
government in steering the development of industrial capacity has to be
revised.

Some key lessons may be learned from the industrialization

experience of Southeast Asian countries.

Additionally, the long-term

development implications of primary specialization is a subject that needs
to be revisited in Latin America. In particular, efforts should be devoted to
analyzing the relationship between primary specialization, income
inequality, and institutional quality from a historical and comparative
perspective.
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